Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) auction is a type of mechanism that is used to determine the most efficient allocation of goods or services among multiple bidders. It is a sealed bid, double auction format where bidders submit bids without knowing the bids of others. The auctioneer then determines the allocation of the goods or services based on the highest bid, but the price paid by the winner is determined by the second-highest bid.
The VCG auction was developed by William Vickrey, David Clarke, and Theodore Groves in the 1960s and 1970s. It is known for its efficiency and truthful bidding incentive, meaning that bidders are incentivized to bid their true valuations of the goods or services being auctioned. This is because a bidder cannot manipulate the price by bidding lower than their true valuation, as they would still have to pay the second-highest bid price if they win.
The VCG auction is widely used in applications such as spectrum auctions, procurement auctions, and ad auctions. It is also used in online advertising and digital marketing, where advertisers compete for ad space on websites and search engines.
Overall, the VCG auction is a widely respected and commonly used mechanism for determining efficient allocations of goods and services. Its incentive structure encourages truthful bidding and ensures that the auction’s outcome is socially optimal.
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